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REJOINDER 
THE WAR ON TERRORISM:  
INTERNATIONAL LAW, CLEAR STATEMENT 
REQUIREMENTS, AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN  
Curtis A. Bradley∗ and Jack L. GoldsmithT∗∗ T 
In Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, T1 T we pre-
sented a framework for interpreting Congress’s September 18, 2001 
Authorization for Use of Military ForceT2 T (AUMF), the central statutory 
enactment related to the war on terrorism.  Congressional Authoriza-
tion addressed a puzzling gap in the academic literature: although 
both constitutional theory and constitutional practice suggest that the 
validity of presidential wartime actions depends to a significant degree 
on their relationship to congressional authorization, the meaning and 
implications of the AUMF have received little attention in the aca-
demic debates over the war on terrorism. 
The framework in Congressional Authorization built on the plural-
ity opinion in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, T3 T which devoted significant attention 
to the AUMF.  The framework, in a nutshell, is as follows: The mean-
ing of the AUMF should be determined in the first instance by its text, 
as informed by a comparison with authorizations of force in prior 
wars, including declared wars.  In clarifying the meaning of the “nec-
essary and appropriate force” that Congress authorized, T4 T courts should 
look primarily to two interpretive factors: Executive Branch practice 
during prior wars and the international laws of war.  Delegation con-
cerns should not play a significant role in interpreting the AUMF, but 
a clear statement requirement is appropriate when the President takes 
actions under the AUMF that restrict the liberty of non-combatants in 
the United States. 
Congressional Authorization did not attempt to resolve every ques-
tion that might arise under the AUMF.  Instead, it sought to establish 
a starting point for analysis that would be useful to courts and the Ex-
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ecutive Branch in addressing the complex and sometimes novel issues 
in the war on terrorism, and to stimulate academic discussion of Con-
gress’s important enactment.  The latter goal is well served by the 
three Replies to Congressional Authorization in this issue of the Har-
vard Law Review. 
Although each of the Replies approaches the AUMF from a differ-
ent perspective, none expresses fundamental disagreement with our 
framework.  Professors Goodman and Jinks describe our framework as 
“useful,” but maintain that we have understated the importance of the 
international laws of war within the framework.5  Professor Sunstein 
argues that administrative law should play a greater role than we sug-
gested, and the international laws of war a less substantial role.  He 
also advocates a broader clear statement requirement.6  Otherwise, he 
approaches the AUMF in ways similar to Congressional Authorization, 
and reaches similar conclusions.  Professor Tushnet suggests that ours 
is a reasonable approach to interpreting the AUMF, but he maintains 
that its very reasonableness demonstrates the danger of relying on 
Congress to police executive power during wartime, and suggests that 
the only solution may be a constitutional amendment.7
Below, we address three issues raised by these Replies: first, the 
proper role of the international laws of war in the interpretation of the 
AUMF; second, the circumstances in which a clear statement require-
ment is appropriate in ascertaining the scope of the AUMF; and third, 
the implications of our analysis for the ability of the current constitu-
tional system to ensure optimal tradeoffs between liberty and security 
during war. 
I.  THE AUMF AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAWS OF WAR 
Congressional Authorization argued that, in broadly authorizing 
the President to use “all necessary and appropriate force,” Congress 
implicitly authorized actions permitted under the international laws of 
war.  It also argued that, because the laws of war can inform the scope 
of Congress’s authorization, they can also inform limitations on that 
authorization.  Absent textual or other evidence to the contrary, there-
fore, the AUMF should not be viewed as authorizing presidential ac-
tions in violation of the laws of war.8  As a result, such actions would 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 
 5 See Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S. War Powers, and the Global 
War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653 (2005).  
 6 See Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663 (2005).   
 7 See Mark Tushnet, Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. 
REV. 2673 (2005).  
 8 For reasons explained in Congressional Authorization, we limited this claim to jus in bello 
rules of international law that govern the conduct of war and did not extend the claim to jus ad 
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be valid only if they fell within the independent constitutional author-
ity of the President. 
Professor Sunstein and Professors Goodman and Jinks take differ-
ent, and conflicting, positions on the proper role of the international 
laws of war in our framework.  While Professor Sunstein suggests that 
Congressional Authorization overstates the importance of the laws of 
war,9 Professors Goodman and Jinks contend that Congressional Au-
thorization “systematically understate[s] the interpretive significance” 
of this body of law.10  We address these positions in turn. 
A.  Relevance 
In suggesting that the international laws of war should play a less 
significant role than the one we proposed in Congressional Authoriza-
tion, Professor Sunstein states that “it is best to start with statutory 
text and more familiar administrative law principles.”11  We agree with 
the beginning of this statement.  The first two substantive parts of 
Congressional Authorization focus on the text of the AUMF, its draft-
ing history, and its relationship to past authorizations of force.12  We 
disagree, however, with Professor Sunstein’s suggestion that “adminis-
trative law principles,” particularly the Chevron doctrine, have logical 
priority over the international laws of war.  As Professor Sunstein ob-
serves, Chevron deference is triggered only after a court determines, 
using the appropriate tools of statutory construction, that the statutory 
provision under consideration is silent or ambiguous.13  The interna-
tional laws of war are one such tool for interpreting the AUMF and 
therefore would properly be considered under the first step of the 
Chevron doctrine, assuming, as Professor Sunstein contends, that doc-
trine applies to the AUMF. 
The international laws of war reflect widely accepted background 
norms, relating to the very subject of the authorization (the use of 
force in international relations), against which Congress legislated.14  
In addition, there is a long tradition of both courts and presidents rely-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
bellum rules governing when nations can use force.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 
2089–91. 
 9 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2664.  
 10 Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2653.  
 11 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2664 n.7. 
 12 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2056–83. 
 13 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2665; see also Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. Cline, 124 S. 
Ct. 1236, 1248 (2004); Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 
n.9 (1984). 
 14 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2091–92; cf. Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2664 n.7 
(noting that the laws of war might “furnish a set of principles, vindicated by tradition, against 
which authorizations for the use of force should be understood”).  
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ing on the laws of war to inform the President’s wartime powers.15  
This consistent understanding during wartime is an especially relevant 
source of meaning because the AUMF purports to authorize presiden-
tial action in an area of concurrent presidential authority.16  Following 
in this tradition, the Supreme Court plurality in Hamdi properly 
looked to the laws of war in ascertaining the “necessary and appropri-
ate” force that Congress authorized in the AUMF.17
We believe that Professor Sunstein’s resolution of the six hypotheti-
cals that he poses at the outset of his Reply would be more nuanced 
and persuasive if he looked to the international laws of war in inter-
preting the AUMF.  For example, Professor Sunstein states that the 
President’s ability to use force against entities that have assisted al 
Qaeda only after the September 11 attacks poses a “difficult” issue, but 
he does not attempt to resolve it.18  As we explained in Congressional 
Authorization, the international law principles concerning co-
belligerency provide useful guidance in resolving this issue.19  In addi-
tion, Professor Sunstein simply asserts that the killing of an American 
citizen at a U.S. airport would not be a necessary and appropriate use 
of force under the AUMF.20  The international law rules concerning 
the use of force against unarmed and nonthreatening combatants, by 
 
 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 15 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2091–92.  
 16 See id. at 2086 n.160, 2100.  
 17 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2641 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
 18 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2667 & n.31. 
 19 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2112–13.  The text of the AUMF also provides 
more guidance than suggested by Professor Sunstein.  He states that we emphasize that “the 
President could not use force against nations or individuals that cannot plausibly be connected 
with the attacks of September 11, 2001.”  Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2667 (emphasis added).  This 
description omits the AUMF’s reference to “organizations” with a connection to the September 11 
attacks.  Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2(a), Pub. L. No. 107-40, 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001).  As Congressional Authorization explained, terrorist organizations with an adequately 
close post–September 11 connection to al Qaeda can properly be deemed part of an organization 
responsible for the attacks.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2110–12.  The interna-
tional law co-belligerency standard is relevant only as a guide for determining the adequacy of the 
connection.  See id. at 2112. 
 20 See Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2668.  It is unclear from Professor Sunstein’s treatment of his 
hypotheticals how he views the “necessary and appropriate” language in the AUMF.  For example, 
although he views that language as precluding the use of excessive force in his hypothetical con-
cerning the killing of a U.S. citizen at a U.S. airport, he does not impose such a restriction on ex-
cessive force in resolving the other hypotheticals, such as his hypotheticals about invading Iraq 
based on the AUMF or detaining French citizens who provide financial support to organizations 
that support al Qaeda.  See id. at 2667–68.  As we explained in Congressional Authorization, we 
do not believe that Congress intended the phrase “necessary and appropriate” to operate as an 
independent textual restriction beyond its possible implicit reference to prior Executive Branch 
practice and the laws of war.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2081–82.  
2005] THE WAR ON TERRORISM 2687 
contrast, provide more principled and refined justifications for his  
conclusion.21
B.  Significance 
Professors Goodman and Jinks agree with us that the laws of war 
are relevant to interpreting the AUMF, but they contend that we have 
understated their significance.22  First, they argue that the laws of war 
limit the class of individuals who can be subjected to the use of force 
more substantially than we suggested.  Second, they argue that the 
President’s power to detain enemy combatants is subject to a broader 
array of international law conditions than we suggested. 
1.  Individuals Covered by the AUMF. — Congress in the AUMF 
authorized the use of force against “organizations” connected to the 
September 11 attacks,23 which uncontroversially includes al Qaeda.  
In Congressional Authorization, we argued that, when it is unclear 
whether an individual is a member of an organization covered by the 
AUMF, the law-of-war criteria for combatancy can help resolve the is-
sue.  For example, because international law treats civilians who “di-
rectly participate” in hostilities as combatants who can be targeted and 
detained, persons who directly participate in al Qaeda’s terrorist ac-
tivities against the United States should be viewed as covered by the 
AUMF.24
Professors Goodman and Jinks argue that the direct participation 
standard is not merely a relevant consideration, it is the only relevant 
consideration.25  Under their analysis, the President would not have 
statutory authority to use force against or detain members of al Qaeda 
unless those members had directly participated in hostilities against 
the United States.26  They also suggest that many (and perhaps most) 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 21 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2120–21 n.325. 
 22 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2653. 
 23 See Authorization for Use of Military Force, § 2(a), 115 Stat. at 224. 
 24 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2115–16. 
 25 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2655, 2657.   
 26 Professors Goodman and Jinks overstate matters in claiming that the direct participation 
standard is “precise,” id. at 2655, and suffers from only “modest . . . definitional squabbles,” id. at 
2656.  In its recent study on customary international law related to the laws of war, the Interna-
tional Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), an organization expert in the laws of war and not un-
duly cautious about embracing progressive developments in customary international law, noted 
that “[a] precise definition of the term ‘direct participation in hostilities’ does not exist.”  I JEAN-
MARIE HENCKAERTS & LOUISE DOSWALD-BECK, INT’L COMM. OF THE RED CROSS, 
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 22 (2005); see also id. (noting that state 
practice “gives little or no guidance on the interpretation of the term ‘direct participation’”).  U.S. 
military and academic commentators have similarly noted the unsettled nature of this standard.  
See, e.g., Michael E. Guillory, Civilianizing the Force: Is the United States Crossing the Rubi-
con?, 51 A.F. L. REV. 111, 116–20 (2001); Lisa L. Turner & Lynn G. Norton, Civilians at the Tip 
of the Spear, 51 A.F. L. REV. 1, 28 (2001). 
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members of al Qaeda do not meet this direct participation require-
ment.27
As an initial matter, although Professors Goodman and Jinks pur-
port to rely on international law only for its “interpretive significance 
for the AUMF,”28 their analysis loses sight of the AUMF.  The class of 
individuals subject to the AUMF is not, as they suggest, a free-floating 
question of international law.  The AUMF expressly authorizes the use 
of force “against those . . . organizations” responsible for “the terrorist 
attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001,”29 a description that, as 
noted above, includes al Qaeda.  As a result, individuals who are un-
controversially part of that organization — because, for example, they 
admit to being members, or because they carry out orders in the or-
ganization’s chain of command — are covered by the AUMF regard-
less of whether they satisfy the direct participation standard.30
Even if it were proper to disregard the AUMF’s text, Professors 
Goodman and Jinks’s insistence that direct participation is the only 
criterion for combatant status in the armed conflict against al Qaeda 
and related terrorist organizations is unsupported by the materials they 
cite and is inconsistent with standard assumptions underlying the laws 
of war.  They assert that, under the laws of war, military force may be 
used against only two categories of individuals — lawful combatants 
and unlawful combatants — and, more importantly, that the latter 
category is limited to civilians who directly participate in hostilities.31  
As a result, Professors Goodman and Jinks contend that because 
members of al Qaeda do not qualify as lawful combatants, they are 
presumptively civilians and the United States cannot use force against 
them unless they directly participate in hostilities against the United 
States.32  Like any syllogism, the validity of this argument depends on 
its premise, and the premise here — that in an armed conflict between 
a state and a terrorist organization, the members of the terrorist or-
ganization are deemed civilians unless they directly participate in hos-
tilities — is flawed.  The only support Professors Goodman and Jinks 
offer for this premise is Article 51 of the First Additional Protocol to 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 27 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2657–58. 
 28 Id. at 2654 n.5. 
 29 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001). 
 30 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2114–15.  The authorization to use force against 
“nations” would not imply an authority to use force against all members of a nation because the 
international laws of war as applied to interstate conflicts specifically limit the use of force to a 
nation’s armed forces and related direct participants in the war, and affirmatively immunize from 
attack civilian non-combatants.  By contrast, international law does not specifically limit the use 
of force to only a subset of a militant terrorist organization, especially an organization that, like al 
Qaeda, has as its defining purpose the waging of illegal war. 
 31 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2655. 
 32 See id. at 2657–58. 
2005] THE WAR ON TERRORISM 2689 
the Geneva Conventions.33  The United States, however, has not rati-
fied that Protocol.  Moreover, Article 51 does not state that everyone 
other than lawful combatants must be classified as civilians, let alone 
that members of a terrorist organization must be so classified.  Rather, 
it merely states that civilians should receive certain protections “unless 
and for such time as they take a direct part in hostilities.”34
Professors Goodman and Jinks’s approach is also inconsistent with 
standard assumptions underlying the laws of war.  It is widely recog-
nized that a nation involved in an armed conflict is permitted under 
the laws of war to use force against most of the enemy’s armed forces, 
regardless of whether those forces meet the direct participation stan-
dard.35  By contrast, Professors Goodman and Jinks would disallow 
the use of force against most members of al Qaeda, even though al 
Qaeda is a military organization dedicated to waging illegal war.  Un-
der their proposed approach, al Qaeda military recruits training in Af-
ghanistan could not be targeted or detained because these members of 
al Qaeda have not yet directly participated in hostilities.36  Indeed, 
Professors Goodman and Jinks’s analysis could lead to the absurd con-
clusion that even Osama bin Laden could not be targeted or detained, 
since, while he is the leader of al Qaeda, it could be argued that he has 
not directly participated in hostilities (or is no longer participating in 
them).37  In sum, Professors Goodman and Jinks’s approach to armed 
conflicts would confer substantially more immunity from attack and 
detention on unlawful combatant groups than on the lawful armed 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 33 See id. at 2655 nn.6–7. 
 34 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Pro-
tection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, art. 51(3), 
1125 U.N.T.S. 3, 26.  The sources that Professors Goodman and Jinks cite concerning the scope of 
the direct participation test, see Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2655–57 nn.8–28, do not sug-
gest that members of terrorist groups must be treated in an armed conflict as non-combatants 
unless they meet the test.  Rather, these sources focus on the questions whether and when tradi-
tional civilian non-combatants can be deemed combatants because they directly participate in an 
armed conflict. 
 35 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2114 & n.300; see also, e.g., YORAM DINSTEIN, 
THE CONDUCT OF HOSTILITIES UNDER THE LAW OF INTERNATIONAL ARMED 
CONFLICT 27 (2004) (noting that “[m]embers of the armed forces of a belligerent Party (except 
medical and religious personnel)” are considered combatants “even if their specific task is not 
linked to active hostilities” (citation omitted)); Knut Ipsen, Combatants and Non-Combatants, in 
THE HANDBOOK OF INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW 65, 66 (Dieter Fleck ed., 1995) 
(“[F]or members of the armed forces combatant status is the rule, while the classification of non-
combatant status is an exception.”). 
 36 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2657 (noting that “training” is not direct participa-
tion (quoting W. Hays Parks, Memorandum of Law: Executive Order 12333 and Assassination, 
ARMY LAW., Dec. 1989, at 9 app. C)). 
 37 Cf. id. (articulating the direct participation test and concluding that “members [of the terror-
ist group] conducting ‘local intelligence, intermediate logistics, recruiting, [and] training’ would 
retain their status as noncombatants” (second alteration in original) (quoting Parks, supra note 36, 
at 9 app. C)). 
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forces of enemy nations — a result directly at odds with the usual as-
sumptions of the laws of war and with common sense.38  
2.  International Law Conditions. — Professors Goodman and 
Jinks also claim that we have understated the extent to which interna-
tional law imposes conditions on the President’s authority to detain 
enemy combatants.  In Congressional Authorization, we argued that 
the President’s violation of the laws of war would not negate authority 
otherwise implicitly conferred by the AUMF (such as the power to de-
tain enemy combatants) unless the law-of-war rule in question were a 
condition, under international law, of that authority.39  Professors 
Goodman and Jinks agree with this claim, but they contend that there 
will be a wide range of international law conditions that might be 
relevant to actions taken under the AUMF. 
Congressional Authorization did not purport to make a quantita-
tive assessment of the number of international law rules that are, or 
are not, conditions.  We did argue, and Professors Goodman and Jinks 
do not appear to dispute,40 that Article 5 of the Third Geneva Conven-
tion (which calls for hearings before competent tribunals when there is 
doubt about whether a captured belligerent qualifies as a prisoner of 
war41) is not framed as a condition on the power to detain.42  We also 
suggested that several other provisions in the Third Geneva Conven-
tion, such as access to a canteen, should not be viewed as conditions 
on the detention power,43 but we made no other specific claims.  As a 
result, although Professors Goodman and Jinks phrase this portion of 
their Reply as if it were a disagreement with our analysis, the basis for 
their disagreement is unclear. 
Without engaging in a point-by-point assessment of the various 
rules they cite, we would emphasize that the rules must actually apply 
to terrorist combatants for them to operate as conditions on presiden-
tial action under the AUMF.  Yet Professors Goodman and Jinks never 
establish that the various international law rules they cite actually do 
apply in the conflict between the United States and terrorists covered 
by the AUMF.  For example, they assume without any argument or 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 38 Cf. A.P.V. ROGERS, LAW ON THE BATTLEFIELD 33 (2d ed. 2004) (noting that “there is a 
strong argument that if a person belongs to a group of guerrilla fighters that carries out attacks on 
opposing armed forces,” and the group does not conduct its operations in accordance with the 
laws of war, “he may be considered to have forfeited his civilian status for the duration of his 
membership of, or participation in the actions of, that group” (emphasis added)). 
 39 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2094–96. 
 40 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2660 n.39. 
 41 See Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949, 
opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art. 5, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 3322–24, 75 U.N.T.S. 135, 140–42 [here-
inafter Third Geneva Convention]. 
 42 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2095–96. 
 43 See id. at 2095. 
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qualification that the Third Geneva Convention (governing the treat-
ment of prisoners of war) and the Fourth Geneva Convention44 (gov-
erning the treatment of “civilians”) apply in this conflict.45  The basis 
for this assumption is never specified, and in the unqualified fashion in 
which it is suggested by Professors Goodman and Jinks it is very likely 
wrong.  Among other things, Common Article 2 of these Conventions 
appears to preclude their applicability to conflicts with non-state ter-
rorist organizations.  It provides that the Geneva Conventions “shall 
apply to . . . any . . . armed conflict which may arise between two or 
more of the High Contracting Parties.”46  Al Qaeda is not a state, 
much less a high contracting party to the Geneva Conventions.  Com-
mon Article 2 also applies the Geneva Conventions to a non-party 
Power that “accepts and applies the provisions thereof.”47  It is doubt-
ful that al Qaeda is a “Power” within the meaning of Common Article 
2, but even if it were, it does not accept and apply the Conventions.48  
For these reasons, the President appears to have correctly concluded 
that al Qaeda is not a party to the Third Geneva Convention and is 
therefore not covered by it.49
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 
 44 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 
12, 1949, opened for signature Aug. 12, 1949, art 79, 6 U.S.T. 3517, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. 
 45 See Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2659–61. 
 46 Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. at 3318, 75 U.N.T.S. at 136 (em-
phasis added). 
 47 Id. 
 48 Nor does it matter, for purposes of Common Article 2, that al Qaeda may have been fight-
ing in conjunction with the Afghan Taliban forces, who we can assume (as President Bush deter-
mined) are covered by the Geneva Conventions.  Common Article 2 states that, “[a]lthough one of 
the Powers in conflict may not be a party to the present Convention, the Powers who are parties 
thereto shall remain bound by it in their mutual relations.”  Id.  This provision makes clear that 
even when two states fight together against a third state in a traditional armed conflict, the third 
state is bound by the Geneva Conventions only vis-à-vis the enemy that is a party to the Geneva 
Conventions, not with respect to the enemy that is not a party to the Conventions.  See, e.g., 
MORRIS GREENSPAN, THE MODERN LAW OF LAND WARFARE 68, 97 (1959); HOWARD S. 
LEVIE, PRISONERS OF WAR IN INTERNATIONAL ARMED CONFLICTS 24–25 (U.S. Naval War 
Coll., Int’l Law Studies Vol. 59, 1979).  At a minimum, the same rule should apply when the non-
party armed forces are members of a terrorist organization.  In addition, al Qaeda probably can-
not benefit from Article 4 of the Third Geneva Convention, which provides that militias and 
other volunteer corps that “belong[] to a Party to the conflict” can qualify as prisoners of war un-
der the Convention if they satisfy the four traditional prerequisites for lawful combatancy.  See 
Third Geneva Convention, supra note 41, art. 4(a)(2), 6 U.S.T. at 3320, 75 U.N.T.S. at 138.  Be-
cause it is unlikely that al Qaeda “belongs to” Afghanistan (which is a Party to the conflict), one 
need not even reach the issue whether it has satisfied the four traditional criteria (which, as Pro-
fessors Goodman and Jinks acknowledge, it almost certainly has not, see Goodman & Jinks, supra 
note 5, at 2657). 
 49 See Office of the White House Press Sec’y, Fact Sheet: Status of Detainees at Guantanamo 
(Feb. 7, 2002), http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/20020207-13.html.  Professors 
Goodman and Jinks suggest that President Bush has “determine[d] that [the law of armed con-
flict] is inapplicable to the conflict” against terrorists and that the Executive Branch is not using 
the law-of-war framework.  Goodman & Jinks, supra note 5, at 2659 n.35.  In fact, President Bush 
simply determined that the Third Geneva Convention did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda 
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II.  CLEAR STATEMENT REQUIREMENT 
Congressional Authorization analyzed at length when a clear 
statement requirement would be appropriate in interpreting the 
AUMF.50  It concluded that a clear statement requirement is war-
ranted for presidential wartime actions that restrict the liberty of non-
combatants in the United States, but not for presidential actions that 
restrict the liberty of combatants.51
Professor Sunstein proposes a different clear statement require-
ment.  Specifically, he contends that, although the President should re-
ceive Chevron deference when he interprets the AUMF, “if the Presi-
dent is infringing on constitutionally sensitive interests, the AUMF 
must be construed narrowly, whatever the President says.”52  He also 
claims that, in interpreting the AUMF, “liberty should always receive 
the benefit of the doubt.”53
In our view, this formulation is overly broad and indeterminate.  It 
is unclear what the phrase “constitutionally sensitive interests” (and 
the related phrases that Professor Sunstein uses in his Reply54) entails.  
For example, Professor Sunstein does not explain whether his clear 
statement requirement is limited to constructions of the AUMF that 
violate constitutional rights, or whether it also applies to constructions 
that raise constitutional questions or, even more broadly, to construc-
tions that implicate constitutional values.  It is also unclear what Pro-
fessor Sunstein means by “liberty.”55  Most presidential actions under 
the AUMF will affect liberty, and many of these actions might also af-
fect constitutionally sensitive interests, especially if they are directed 
against U.S. citizens.  For example, if the President orders the bombing 
or detention of enemy combatants covered by the AUMF in Afghani-
stan, that action will have a significant effect on the liberty of those 
combatants and may (especially if they are U.S. citizens) implicate con-
stitutionally sensitive interests.  Yet we doubt that Professor Sunstein 
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
and that Taliban detainees did not qualify under the Convention for prisoner-of-war status.  See 
Office of the White House Press Sec’y, supra; see also William H. Taft, IV, The Law of Armed 
Conflict After 9/11: Some Salient Features, 28 YALE J. INT’L L. 319, 320 (2003) (then–Legal Ad-
viser to the U.S. State Department stating that “[t]he body of the law of armed conflict would thus 
apply — and, from a U.S. perspective, there was never a question of not applying the law, or of 
stepping away from international rules”). 
 50 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2102–06. 
 51 See id. at 2106. 
 52 Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2664 (emphasis added).  
 53 Id. at 2672. 
 54 Professor Sunstein uses a variety of formulations for his clear statement test, and it is not 
clear whether the different formulations all have the same meaning.  Compare id. at 2664 (“consti-
tutionally sensitive interests”), with id. at 2669 (“constitutionally protected interests”), and id. at 
2672 (“constitutionally sensitive rights”). 
 55 See id. at 2668–70. 
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believes Congress should be required to enact additional legislation 
beyond the AUMF before the President could bomb or detain enemy 
combatants in Afghanistan.  Indeed, the Court in Hamdi implicitly 
held that such additional legislation was unnecessary.56
Congressional Authorization argued that the relevant precedent 
supports a more precise trigger for the clear statement requirement: 
the requirement should apply when presidential actions under the 
AUMF restrict the liberty of non-combatants in the United States, but 
not when they restrict the liberty of combatants.57  The Supreme 
Court in Duncan v. Kahanamoku58 and Ex parte Endo59 applied a 
clear statement requirement in the context of presidential actions 
against civilian non-combatants, but suggested that the same require-
ment would not apply if the President engaged in traditional military 
functions against combatants.60  By contrast, in Ex parte Quirin,61 the 
Court did not apply a clear statement requirement, even though the 
case involved the detention and trial of a U.S. citizen — practices that 
restricted liberty and presumably implicated constitutionally sensitive 
interests.  Similarly, the plurality in Hamdi did not purport to apply a 
clear statement requirement, even though the case involved the deten-
tion of a U.S. citizen in the United States.62  The central difference be-
tween Duncan and Endo on the one hand, and Quirin and Hamdi on 
the other, is that the latter cases involved actions taken against  
combatants.   
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 56 See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 2633, 2640–42 (2004) (plurality opinion) (interpreting the 
AUMF as authorizing detention of U.S. citizen enemy combatants captured in Afghanistan). 
 57 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2105–06. 
 58 327 U.S. 304 (1946). 
 59 323 U.S. 283 (1944). 
 60 See Duncan, 327 U.S. at 310; Endo, 323 U.S. at 300–04; see also Bradley & Goldsmith, su-
pra note 1, at 2104–05.  Professor Sunstein also relies on a district court decision by Judge 
Learned Hand, Masses Publishing Co. v. Patten, 244 F. 535 (S.D.N.Y. 1917).  See Sunstein, supra 
note 6, at 2669.  In Masses, the court held that in the absence of specific congressional authoriza-
tion, the Executive Branch could not interfere with U.S. mail in an effort to stop antiwar propa-
ganda during World War I.  244 F. at 536, 539–41, 543.  This decision is consistent with our posi-
tion that a clear statement requirement is appropriate during wartime when the President takes 
action to restrict the liberty of non-combatants in the United States.  It is also worth noting that 
the relevant government actor in Masses was the Postmaster General, whose authority, the court 
noted, was entirely derived from statute.  Id. at 538 (“The defendant’s authority is based upon the 
act of Congress, and the intention of that act is the single measure of that authority.”).  The deci-
sion therefore does not speak to situations in which the President is acting pursuant to independ-
ent constitutional authority.   
 61 317 U.S. 1 (1942). 
 62 Professor Sunstein asserts that the plurality implicitly and correctly found in the AUMF a 
clear statement authorizing detention of U.S. citizens, see Sunstein, supra note 6, at 2670, but his 
interpretation of the plurality opinion can only be sustained if one adopts a weak version of the 
clear statement requirement — so weak, in fact, that it is not apparent what work the clear 
statement requirement is doing.  The AUMF, after all, does not even refer to detention, let alone 
the detention of U.S. citizens, which was the presidential action at issue in Hamdi. 
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In sum, the clear statement requirement outlined in Congressional 
Authorization provides better guidance to courts and the Executive 
Branch than the one proposed by Professor Sunstein, and is consistent 
with Hamdi and prior Supreme Court decisions regulating presidential 
power during wartime. 
III.  CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN 
Professor Tushnet suggests that our framework is premised on a 
separation-of-powers model for supervising presidential power, by 
which he means that it assumes that Congress is the primary agent for 
policing Executive Branch wartime action and ensuring that the 
President makes optimal wartime tradeoffs between liberty and secu-
rity.  He contends that the framework “indirectly challenge[s] the ade-
quacy” of this model because it shows that the AUMF can reasonably 
be interpreted to authorize actions in the United States that threaten 
the liberties of U.S. citizens.63  He also expresses doubt about whether 
the principal alternative model — a judicial-review model in which 
courts are charged with controlling political branch excesses during 
wartime — is any better, given the tendency of courts to defer to the 
political branches.64  He concludes his Reply by suggesting the possi-
bility of amending the Constitution in order to address the problem of 
protecting liberty during wartime.65
Professor Tushnet’s questions about constitutional design, while 
thought-provoking, are beyond the scope of our project.  Ultimately, 
Congressional Authorization is about how to interpret the AUMF 
within the context of our current constitutional system, not how to de-
sign a system that would best regulate the conduct of war.  We do, 
however, have several observations about Professor Tushnet’s analysis. 
First, Professor Tushnet appears to overstate the dichotomy be-
tween the separation-of-powers and judicial-review models.  These 
models have never been mutually exclusive means of regulating presi-
dential action during wartime.  For example, although the Supreme 
Court has never invalidated a presidential wartime action that it con-
cluded was authorized by Congress,66 it has sometimes exercised 
searching judicial review to conclude that a seemingly authorized Ex-
––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––– 
 63 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 2675. 
 64 See id. at 2679–80. 
 65 Id. at 2680–82. 
 66 The Court in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. (4 Wall.) 2 (1866), stated that Congress could not 
authorize military commissions to try non-combatant civilians where civilian courts were open, 
id. at 121–22, but as the dissent there pointed out, this statement was dicta because Congress had 
in fact prohibited, not authorized, the use of military commissions.  See id. at 136 (Chase, C.J., 
dissenting). 
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ecutive Branch action was not in fact authorized.67  The interpretive 
tools that the Court has employed in these cases — such as requiring a 
clear statement before construing a statute to authorize presidential 
acts that impinge on the rights of U.S. citizen non-combatants — are 
important aspects of our framework for interpreting the AUMF.68  
Furthermore, the mere possibility of judicial review can have impor-
tant effects on Executive Branch action, as evidenced by the Executive 
Branch’s decision to confer additional procedural rights on enemy 
combatants after the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hamdi and 
Rasul last Term and especially after the Court made clear in those de-
cisions that it would exercise judicial review over the Executive’s ac-
tions.69
Second, we believe that Professor Tushnet’s concerns stem from an 
unduly narrow conception of the limitations in our framework on the 
scope of Congress’s authorization in the AUMF.  He maintains that 
our framework’s “only operative limitation” on the AUMF is the Sep-
tember 11 nexus requirement.70  But Congressional Authorization 
identifies many other important limits on what Congress authorized in 
the AUMF, including the international laws of war, traditional prac-
tice, the clear statement requirement for action against non-
combatants in the United States, and habeas corpus review, which in-
cludes an independent judicial assessment of, among other things, the 
procedural adequacy of presidential determinations related to the de-
tention, and possibly the trial, of enemy combatants.71
These factors preclude an interpretation of the AUMF that would 
authorize Professor Tushnet’s hypothetical mass detention of Arab 
American males in the United States.72  Since the AUMF only author-
izes the use of force against “nations, organizations, or persons” with a 
connection to the September 11 attacks,73 it would not authorize the 
detention of Arab American males who do not have, and are not mem-
bers of an organization that has, such a connection.  Independent of 
this textual limitation, the hypothesized mass detention would restrict 
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 67 Two examples are Duncan and Endo.  A third example is Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. 
Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952), in which the government and the dissent argued that the President 
was simply taking care to execute an array of congressional statutes related to national security.  
See id. at 701 (Vinson, C.J., dissenting). 
 68 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2102–06. 
 69 See id. at 2126–27. 
 70 Tushnet, supra note 7, at 2675. 
 71 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2122; see also Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 124 S. Ct. 
2633, 2636–39 (2004) (plurality opinion) (allowing a U.S. citizen detained in the United States as 
an enemy combatant to challenge the factual basis for his designation through a writ of habeas 
corpus). 
 72 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 2673. 
 73 Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 
(2001). 
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the liberty of non-combatants in the United States, and thus should 
not be viewed as authorized by Congress absent a clear statement. 
Professor Tushnet discounts these limitations, and focuses instead 
on the past Executive Branch practice of interning civilians in the 
United States — most notably, the exclusion and internment of Japa-
nese Americans during World War II.74  Since our framework contem-
plates that Executive Branch practice in prior wars informs the mean-
ing of the AUMF, he concludes that it is plausible within our 
framework to view the AUMF as authorizing his hypothesized deten-
tion.  Professor Tushnet’s conclusion, however, cannot survive other 
elements of the framework, which, as just noted, rule out the possibil-
ity of the hypothesized mass detention.  Moreover, even considering 
Executive Branch practice alone, his conclusion would not follow.  
The reason that Executive Branch practice is relevant to interpreting 
the AUMF is that Congress legislates against the backdrop of that 
practice and, absent evidence to the contrary, is presumed to accept 
it.75  Congress, however, cannot plausibly be viewed as having ap-
proved the practice of excluding and interning Japanese Americans 
during World War II.  To the contrary, Congress has made clear that it 
disapproves of that internment.  In 1988, it “acknowledge[d] the fun-
damental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and internment of 
United States citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese an-
cestry during World War II,”76 and authorized the payment of mone-
tary compensation to the victims of the internment.77  Moreover, as we 
noted in Congressional Authorization,78 the legislative history of 18 
U.S.C. § 4001(a), which states that “[n]o citizen shall be imprisoned or 
otherwise detained by the United States except pursuant to an Act of 
Congress,” suggests that Congress specifically wanted to avoid a repe-
tition of that sort of detention of non-combatants.79
Third, although we agree with Professor Tushnet that during war-
time Congress faces political and institutional hurdles to policing Ex-
ecutive Branch action, and that the courts often defer to the political 
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 74 See Tushnet, supra note 7, at 2676–77. 
 75 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2085–86. 
 76 Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-383, § 1(1), 102 Stat. 903, 903 (codified at 50 
U.S.C. app. § 1989 (2000)). 
 77 See id. § 105, 102 Stat. at 905–08 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b-4). 
 78 See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2106 n.271. 
 79 See H.R. REP. NO. 92-116, at 2 (1971), reprinted in 1971 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1435, 1435–36.  In 
contrast, Congress has not expressed disapproval of, and there has not been general criticism of, 
the detention of hundreds of thousands of prisoners of war — including some U.S. citizens — in 
the United States during World War II.  See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 1, at 2106–07 n.271.  
This fact, in addition to the approach taken by the Supreme Court in several World War II–era 
decisions, supports our claim that the AUMF is best viewed as authorizing the President to detain 
those who qualify as enemy combatants under the AUMF, even though it does not authorize the 
detention of non-combatants. 
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branches, we do not believe that these observations by themselves es-
tablish the case for amending the Constitution.  Among other things, 
Professor Tushnet’s claim that the current constitutional system is in-
adequate depends on the assumption that the President (who, despite 
the points noted by Professor Tushnet, remains regulated by Congress 
and the courts, scrutinized by the press, and subject to regular elec-
tions) will, in acting pursuant to the AUMF, overvalue national secu-
rity and undervalue individual liberty, and that he is doing so in the 
war on terrorism.  Professor Tushnet neither justifies this assumption 
nor offers an example of a presidential act authorized by the AUMF 
that would involve such an improper tradeoff between security and 
liberty.80  Moreover, any defense of his assumption would be difficult, 
since it would depend on a contested normative baseline for the ap-
propriate balance between security and liberty, as well as contested 
factual assumptions about the security threats the nation currently 
faces. 
Finally, to justify an amendment to the Constitution, Professor 
Tushnet would need to show that there is a realistic alternative to the 
current constitutional arrangement that would operate better in prac-
tice.  He tentatively suggests a constitutional amendment to create an 
institution of elected judges, legislators, military officers, and civilians 
who would promulgate and enforce “legally binding rules for the con-
duct of military engagements.”81  It is not obvious why such an institu-
tion would do a better job than our current constitutional scheme of 
balancing liberty and security, but it does seem likely that such an in-
stitution would be less effective in fighting wars. 
IV.  CONCLUSION 
Each of the three Replies offers a useful perspective on the frame-
work for interpreting the AUMF that we set forth in Congressional 
Authorization.  Despite our disagreement with some aspects of the Re-
plies, we believe that they confirm the importance of focusing on the 
AUMF, at least as a starting point, in making legal assessments of the 
President’s authority in the war on terrorism. 
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 80 As noted above, we do not believe that his hypothetical about mass detention of Arab 
Americans can plausibly be said to be authorized by the AUMF. 
 81 Tushnet, supra note 7, at 2681. 
